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INTRODUCTION
The modern business environment is considered more complex and
challenging than ever before. 1 Businesses now rely heavily on their Chief
Compliance Officers (“CCO”) to ensure their business practices adhere to
the increasingly numerous laws and regulations that apply to their
* Senior Note & Comment Editor, Volume 7, American University Business Law
Review; JD/MBA Candidate, American University, Washington College of Law, 2019;
B.A. Political Science, B.S. Business Administration, University at Buffalo (SUNY),
2015. I would like to thank my editors, Catriona Coppler and Alexandra McLeod, as
well as the entire American University Business Law Review staff for their assistance.
1. How to Navigate Risk Management and Compliance Complexity, PWC (2009),
http://www.pwc.com/us/en/increasing-it-effective
ness/assets/sap_grc_process_controls_solution_brief.pdf.
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operations. 2 The number of CCOs in major financial institutions has
correspondingly doubled since 2005. 3 This Article will summarize the
principal laws, regulations, and jurisprudence that can confer personal
liability for a CCO in the banking and finance industries. 4 While the author
has attempted to include a variety of industries to which such laws apply,
this piece does not purport to be a complete examination of every possible
law, regulation, rule, guideline, or edict imposed through enforcement
applicable to all industries.
II. FEDERAL LAWS
A. Banks and Banking
In addition to applicable State laws, the United States banking industry is
governed by Title 12 of the United States Code. 5 Banks and other
depository institutions are further overseen by numerous federal
government agencies, including the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation
(“FDIC”), the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (“OCC”), the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the U.S. Treasury Department,
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”), and the National
Credit Union Administration (“NCUA”). These agencies supervise,
examine, and enforce safety and soundness requirements, consumer
protection laws, and regulations for the institutions under their jurisdiction.
The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) is also responsible for enforcing certain
laws (e.g., the Americans with Disabilities Act) and has authority to
conduct civil and criminal investigations of banks’ and financial
institutions’ activities.
i.

Unsafe or Unsound Practices

If a federal banking regulator finds that a CCO previously engaged in or
is about to engage in an unsafe or unsound practice in violation of a federal
2. Cynthia Dow, How the Chief Compliance Officer role is transforming across
Financial Services, RUSSELL REYNOLDS ASSOCIATES (Apr. 28, 2016),
http://www.russellreynolds.com/insights /thought-leadership/how-the-chiefcomplianceofficer-role-is-transforming-across-financial-services.
3. Sam Batkins, The Paperworks: Examining Trends in Regulatory Specialist
Employment, AM. ACTION F. (Sept. 25, 2013), https://www.americanactionforum.
org/research/the-paperworkers-examining-trends-in-.regulatory-specialistemployment/.
4. While there is a large emphasis on compliance in other industries such as
healthcare, this piece focuses primarily on the banking and financial industries.
5. See generally 12 U.S.C. (2012).
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banking law, the regulator may issue a cease and desist order. 6 The order
requires an immediate stop to the behavior and it may apply to both the
institution and individually to the compliance officer.7 Federal regulators
also have the authority to require affirmative action to correct violations
and in some cases, may require a compliance officer to pay monetary
restitution to the financial institution. 8
A CCO may be suspended from his role for the duration of any FDIC,
OCC, Federal Reserve, or NCUA investigation involving a felony of
dishonesty, breach of trust, or a criminal violation of the Bank Secrecy
Act. 9 The suspension remains in effect until the information, indictment, or
complaint is finally disposed of or until terminated by the agency. 10 In
1976, a federal court held that when an instituted affiliated party (“IAP”)
including a CCO, is suspended, due process requires that the individual be
given an immediate post suspension hearing. 11 Since then, a number of
other courts have adopted this reasoning. 12
A federal banking agency may remove a CCO from office if it
determines that the compliance officer violated any law, regulation, or
condition imposed by a regulator, or any written agreement between the
financial institution and a regulator involving unsafe or unsound practices
or breach of fiduciary duty. 13 For a CCO to be removed from office, the
regulator must establish three criteria. 14 First, that the CCO violated a law
or regulation, a final cease–and–desist order, a condition imposed by a
federal banking agency, or a written agreement between the bank and
regulator involving unsafe or unsound practices or a breach of fiduciary
duty. 15 Second, either the CCO’s violation or practice caused the financial
institution a financial loss or other damage, the interest of the institution’s
depositors were or could have been prejudiced, or the CCO personally
benefited from the violation. 16 Lastly, the CCO’s violation must involve
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.

Id. § 1818(b).
Id.
Id. § 1818(b)(6)–(7).
Id. § 1818(g)(3).
See id. § 1818(g).
Feinberg v. Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 420 F. Supp. 109 (D.D.C. 1976).
See generally Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Mallen, 486 U.S. 230, 234 (1988);
Majors v. Green Meadows Apartments, 546 F. Supp. 895, 899 (S.D. Ga. 1980); Am.
Liberty Bail Bonds v. Garamendi, 46 Cal. Rptr. 3d 541, 555 (Ct. App. 2006).
13. See 12 U.S.C. § 1818(e) (recognizing the CCO is entitled to an additional
Administrative Procedures Act hearing if no prior settlement is reached).
14. Id.
15. Id. § 1818(e)(a).
16. Id. § 1818(e)(b).
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personal dishonesty, or otherwise demonstrate willful or continuing
disregard for the safety and soundness of the depository institution.17
Should a CCO knowingly violate a removal order, the banking regulator
may impose criminal penalties on the individual up to five years in prison,
fines up to $1,000,000, or both. 18
ii. Criminal Offense Involving Dishonesty, Breach of Trust, or
Money Laundering
Once a compliance officer has been convicted of a criminal offense
involving dishonesty, breach of trust, or money laundering, he or she will
be terminated from the company and prohibited from working for an
insured depository institution in any capacity. 19 In practical terms, this is
very likely to prevent an individual from obtaining future employment in
the financial field.
A CCO may be subject to civil penalties for violation of banking law. 20
The amount of the penalty is dependent upon the compliance officer’s
mental state with violations imposing strict liability at $7,500 per day the
violation continues; violations involving recklessness imposing fines of
$37,500 per day; and penalties for CCOs who knowingly commit violations
of banking law or knowingly breach their fiduciary duties at $1,425,000 per
day. 21 An Administrative Procedures Act hearing before an Administrative
Law Judge is required if no settlement is reached between the parties,
regardless of which tier of violation is implicated. 22 In determining
whether to assess a civil monetary penalty and the amount, federal
regulators consider the following 13 criteria:
1. Evidence that the violation or practice or breach of fiduciary duty
was intentional or was committed with a disregard of the law or with
a disregard of the consequences to the institution;
2. The duration and frequency of the violations, practices, or breaches
of fiduciary duty;
3. The continuation of the violations, practices, or breach of fiduciary
duty after the respondent was notified or, alternatively, its immediate
cessation and correction;
4. The failure to cooperate with the agency in effecting early resolution
17.
18.
19.
20.

Id. § 1818(e)(c).
Id. § 1818(j).
Id. § 1829(a)(1)(A)–(B).
See id. § 1818(i)(2) (reflecting the civil monetary penalties adjusted for
inflation under 12 C.F.R. § 263.65(b)(2) (2016)).
21. Id. § 1818(i)(2)(A)–(B).
22. Id. § 1818(i)(2)(H).
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of the problem;
5. Evidence of concealment of the violation, practice, or breach of
fiduciary duty or, alternatively, voluntary disclosure of the violation,
practice or breach of fiduciary duty;
6. Any threat of loss, actual loss, or other harm to the institution,
including harm to the public confidence in the institution, and the
degree of such harm;
7. Evidence that a participant or his or her associates received financial
gain or other benefit as a result of the violation, practice, or breach of
fiduciary duty;
8. Evidence of any restitution paid by a participant of losses resulting
from the violation, practice, or breach of fiduciary duty;
9. History of prior violation, practice, or breach of fiduciary duty,
particularly where they are similar to the actions under consideration;
10. Previous criticism of the institution or individual for similar actions;
11. Presence or absence of a compliance program and its effectiveness;
12. Tendency to engage in violations of law, unsafe or unsound banking
practices, or breaches of fiduciary duty; and
13. The existence of agreements, commitments, orders, or conditions
imposed in writing intended to prevent the violation, practice, or
breach of fiduciary duty. 23

In February 2016, the OCC released matrices with new factors and
weight. 24 These new matrices differ from previous criteria as they separate
actions against institutions and individuals, increase the weight for several
factors including intent, continuation of conduct after notification, and
concealment, and add a new factor for “[e]ffectiveness of internal controls
and compliance program.” 25 This signals the OCC’s increased focus on
self-reporting, internal risk management, personal liability of bankers, and
an effort to shift away from rewarding efforts that attempted compliance
but failed, focusing instead on results. 26

23. Interagency Policy Regarding the Assessment of Civil Money Penalties by the
Federal Financial Institutions Regulatory Agencies, 63 Fed. Reg. 30227 (June 3, 1998).
24. See OFFICE OF THE COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, PPM 5000–7 (REV),
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES MANUAL: CIVIL MONEY PENALTIES (2016) available at:
https://www.occ.treas.gov/news-issuances/bulletins/2016/bulletin-2016-5a.pdf.
25. Travis P. Nelson, Prepare For OCC’s New Approach To Civil Money
Penalties, LAW360 (Mar. 15, 2016 10:56 AM), https://www.law360.com/articles/
771266/prepare-for-occ-s-new-approach-to-civil-money-penalties.
26. Id.
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iii. Undercapitalized Institution
If a federal banking agency determines a financial institution is
undercapitalized, it may require the institution to dismiss from office any
senior executive officer, including a CCO. 27 Any CCO who held office for
more than 180 days before the institution became undercapitalized may be
subject to dismissal. 28
iv. Fourteen Predicate Offenses
If a CCO is convicted of one of fourteen predicate offenses, 29 he may be
subject to additional civil penalties by the Attorney General’s office up to
$5,000,000. 30 Courts have since followed five factors for determining civil
penalties under this statute: (1) the good or bad faith of the defendant and
the degree of his scienter; (2) the injury to the public, and whether the
defendant’s conduct created substantial loss or the risk of substantial loss to
other persons; (3) the egregiousness of the violation; (4) the isolated or
repeated nature of the violation; and (5) the defendant’s financial condition
and ability to pay. 31 Since these are civil actions to recover civil penalties
under criminal offenses, the Attorney General only has to prove the right to
recovery by a preponderance of the evidence, rather than the criminal
standard of beyond a reasonable doubt. 32
Federal banking regulators may prohibit or limit, by regulation or order,
any golden parachute payment 33 or indemnification payment to a CCO
27. See 12 U.S.C. § 1831o(f)(2)(F)(ii) (defining executive officer as any person
who “participates or has authority to participate (other than as a director) in major
policymaking functions of the company or bank” under 12 U.S.C. § 375b).
28. Id.
29. See id. § 1833a(c)(1)-(3) (including receipt of gifts for procuring loans; theft by
a bank officer; willfully misapplying property of lending institutions; falsifying bank
entries; falsifying credit transactions; falsifying FDIC transactions; falsifying loan and
credit applications; committing bank fraud; making false claims; making false
statements; concealment of assets from a receiver; mail fraud; wire fraud; and fraud in
connection with Small Business Administration transactions).
30. Id. § 1833a(b)(2).
31. United States v. Menendez, No. 11 Civ. 06313, 2013 WL 828926, at *16–17
(C.D. Cal. Mar. 6, 2013).
32. 12 U.S.C. § 1833a(f).
33. See id. § 1828(k)(4)(A) (defining golden parachutes as any payment by a
covered institution that is “contingent on the termination of such party’s affiliation with
the institution or covered company; and is received on or after the date on which the
insured depository institution or covered company, or any insured depository institution
subsidiary of such covered company, is insolvent . . . the institution’s appropriate
Federal banking agency determines that the insured depository institution is in a
troubled condition . . . the insured depository institution is subject to a proceeding
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resulting from an administrative or civil action. 34 The FDIC has stated that
while a CCO may be indemnified for expenses incurred prior to the
commencement of the formal action (the filing of a notice of charges), an
institution cannot reimburse (or purchase insurance to reimburse) a director
or officer for a civil monetary penalty assessed against them or obtain an
endorsement to its policy which is paid for by the director or officer. 35
However, a financial institution may indemnify a CCO for legal expenses
attributable to charges for which the compliance officer is found not
guilty. 36
v.

Bank Secrecy Act and Recordkeeping

Financial institutions are required to comply with the Bank Secrecy Act
and anti–money laundering regulations issued by the Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network (“FinCEN”), a bureau of the United States
Department of Treasury under Title 31 of the United States Code. 37 The
Bank Secrecy Act requires financial institutions in the U.S. to assist the
U.S. government in preventing money laundering through record keeping
of the cash purchases of negotiable instruments and reporting suspicious
activity. 38
If a domestic financial institution and a director, including a CCO,
willfully violates recordkeeping requirements, he or she may be subject to
civil penalties up to $100,000. 39 For example, in 2014, FinCEN used this
provision to impose a $1 million penalty against the CCO of MoneyGram
for willfully violating the requirement to implement and maintain an anti–
money laundering program. 40 Unlike other government agencies, FinCEN
does not publicly disclose how it assesses a civil monetary penalty and
accused parties are not entitled to an administrative hearing on their
cases. 41

initiated by the Corporation to terminate or suspend deposit insurance for such
institution.”).
34. Id. § 1828(k)(1).
35. 12 C.F.R. §§ 308.18, 359(1)–(2) (2016).
36. Id. § 359.1(l)(2)(ii).
37. See generally 31 U.S.C. (2012).
38. See generally id. §§ 5311–5330.
39. Id. § 5321(a)(1).
40. See Haider, FinCEN Assessment, No. 2014–08 (Dec. 18, 2014).
41. See Robert B. Serino, It’s Anyone’s Guess How Fincen Determines Fines, AM.
BANKER (Mar. 9, 2016, 12:00 PM), https://www.americanbanker.com/opinion/itsanyones-guess-how-fincen-determines-fines.
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An individual, including a CCO, who is found to be willfully in violation
of the Bank Secrecy Act may be fined up to $250,000 and/or imprisoned
for up to five years. 42 If the Bank Secrecy Act violation is part of a pattern
of illegal activity or occurs in connection with another violation involving
more than $100,000 in a twelve–month period, the penalties against a CCO
rise to $500,000 in fines and a maximum prison term of ten years. 43
The CCO of a US financial institution may be subject to monetary
penalties for any willful or grossly negligent violation of recordkeeping
requirements. 44 Violating compliance officers may be subject to fines up to
$10,000 per violation. 45 CCOs may also be subject to criminal penalties by
the DOJ for willful violation of any regulation under the general
recordkeeping requirements for U.S. financial institutions.46 CCOs face
fines up to $1,000, a year in prison, or both if convicted. 47 Additional
criminal penalties including fine increases up to $10,000 and up to five
years in prison, may be assessed if the CCO’s violation is committed in
furtherance of another felony. 48
CCOs who willfully violate the prohibition on structuring transactions to
avoid currency reporting requirements are subject to FinCEN civil penalties
up to the amount involved in the transaction. 49 A compliance officer who
willfully participates in the violation of any reporting requirements for
foreign accounts or transactions may be assessed a civil penalty larger than
$25,000 or the amount involved in the transaction up to $100,000. 50
The Secretary of the Treasury will provide protection from liability for
all employees or officers including CCOs, who report suspicious
transactions that may lead to violations.51 FinCEN also provides protection
from discrimination to CCOs who alert FinCEN of wrongdoing at financial
institutions. 52

42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.

31 U.S.C. § 5322(a).
Id. § 5323(b).
12 U.S.C. § 1955(a) (2012).
Id.
Id. § 1956.
Id.
Id. § 1956.
See id. § 1010.820(e).
See id. § 1010.820(f).
31 U.S.C. § 5318(g) (2012).
See id. § 5328 (exempting protection from those who deliberately participate in
the violation or knowingly provide false information to the authorities).
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B. Commodities and Securities Exchange
Financial institutions engaged in selling and purchasing of securities are
primarily governed by the DOJ and the Securities and Exchange
Commission (“SEC”) under Title 15 of the United States Code. 53 A CCO
found in violation of the Investment Advisors Act will be given a cease and
desist order by the SEC. 54
i.

SEC’s Civil Monetary Penalties

The SEC may subject a CCO to civil monetary penalties for willfully
violating any provision of the 1933, 1934, and Investment Company Acts,
directing or helping another to violate those laws, willfully making a false
statement in an application for registration, or failing to reasonably
supervise another person who violates those laws. 55 The fines range
between $7,500–$80,000 for first tier violations; $80,000–$400,000 for
violations involving fraud, deceit, manipulation, or deliberate or reckless
disregard of a regulatory requirement; and $160,000–$775,000 for
violations that directly or indirectly resulted in substantial losses or created
a significant risk of substantial losses to other persons. 56
The SEC does not have a mechanical formula for assessing civil
monetary penalties separate from the statute. In fact, in 2012, the D.C.
Circuit criticized the SEC for “not provid[ing] a consistent interpretation of
the Rule and not justifying the apparent inconsistency of its application.” 57
For example, in 2015, the SEC charged the CCO of BlackRock Advisors
LLC, an investment adviser, with causing the firm’s compliance–related
violations by failing to implement compliance policies and procedures that
were reasonably designed to prevent violations of the Advisers Act. 58 The
SEC alleged the BlackRock CCO failed to include how compliance
violations should be assessed and monitored for conflict purposes, and
when conflicts of interest should be disclosed to BlackRock fund’s boards
and advisory clients. 59 The CCO agreed to pay a $60,000 penalty. 60 Also
in 2015, the SEC charged the CCO of SFX Financial Advisory
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.

See generally 15 U.S.C. (2012).
Id. § 80b–3(k).
Id. § 80b–3(i)
See id. § 80b–3(i)(A)–(C).
Rapoport v. SEC, 682 F.3d 98, 106 (D.C. Cir. 2012).
See BlackRock Advisors LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4065,
Investment Company Act Release 31,558, 111 SEC Docket 1721 (Apr. 20, 2015).
59. Id.
60. Id.
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Management Enterprises Inc., with failing to implement compliance
policies and procedures that should have detected an alleged
misappropriation of client assets by an executive at the firm. 61 The SEC
further alleged that the CCO was responsible for material misstatements in
firm filings and the CCO agreed to pay a $25,000 fine. 62
Under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, SEC registered clearing
agencies are required by the Commission to appoint a CCO who reports
directly to the Board of Directors, administers compliance procedures,
resolves conflicts of interest, and supervises company practices. 63 Any
individual, including a CCO, who engages in manipulative behavior on
which investors rely, is liable for securities fraud as the primary violator.64
If the SEC finds a CCO in violation of anti–fraud provisions, it may impose
a fine on the CCO and temporarily or permanently ban the CCO from
acting as a director or officer of any public company. 65 The amount of the
civil penalty will be based on whether the CCO recklessly disregarded
overseeing a violating individual, or the CCO knowingly or recklessly
failed to establish or maintain prevention procedures as mandated by the
SEC. 66 If the SEC determines during an investigation that a CCO is in
violation, or is going to violate securities law, the Commission may order
the CCO to cease and desist from all business conduct. 67 If a CCO “blows
the whistle” on corporate misconduct, the SEC will protect the CCO from
termination, demotion, or suspension by the violating business. 68
The SEC may choose to bring an action against a CCO if, within five
years of the start of the action, the CCO breached his fiduciary duty with
personal misconduct while representing a registered investment company. 69
A CCO who knowingly or recklessly provides assistance to individuals in
violation of securities law may also be liable under Title 15. 70 The SEC
may hold a CCO liable if he willfully makes untrue statements on required
SEC reports and applications. 71 If the CCO is found guilty of making
61. See SFX Fin. Advisory Mgmt. Enters., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 4116 (June 15, 2015).
62. Id.
63. 15 U.S.C. § 78c–3(j) (2012).
64. Id. § 78j; see also In re Charter Commc’ns, Inc., 443 F.3d 987, 991 (8th Cir.
2006).
65. 15 U.S.C. § 78u(d)(2)–(3).
66. Id. § 78u–1(a)(3)–(b).
67. Id. § 78u–3(a).
68. Id. § 78u–6(h)(1)(A).
69. Id. § 80a–35(a).
70. Id. § 80a–47(b).
71. Id. § 80a–48.
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untrue statements, or helping others make untrue statements, he may be
barred or suspended from employment in the investment industry. 72
ii. Private Civil Actions
Under the SEC’s governance, purchasers of securities may also bring
actions against an issuer including the director, executives, or principal
officers (such as a CCO). 73 A CCO may also be liable if he is determined
to be a “controlling person” with “actual power and influence” over policy
decisions. 74 In 2010, an Administrative Law Judge found as part of an
SEC enforcement action that a General Counsel for a brokerage and
investment bank was a supervisor. 75 The case against the General Counsel
was eventually dismissed, but arguably opened the door to compliance
officers and general counsel being labeled as supervisors. 76
C. Criminal Statutes
The DOJ prosecutes all criminal compliance violations under Title 18 of
the United States Code. 77 The DOJ has the ability to prosecute both those
who commit an offense and those who aid and abet an offender as a
principal. 78 Thus, if a CCO aids or abets the commission of a violation, he
or she could be held directly liable. 79 A CCO may also be charged as an
accessory after the fact if he knows an offense has been committed and
assists the offender to avoid prosecution. 80 Willful concealment or
destruction of evidence by a CCO may be prosecuted as obstruction of
justice by the DOJ. 81 Officers of lending, credit, or insurance companies
who willfully misapply money from the company can be held liable under
Title 18 for embezzlement. 82 CCOs who attempt or conspir to commit
72. Id. § 80b–3(f).
73. See 15 U.S.C. § 77d–1(c) (2012); see also id. § 77k(a).
74. See id. § 77o(a); see also Wiley v. Hughes Capital Corp., 746 F. Supp. 1264,

1281–82 (D.N.J. 1990).
75. See Urban, SEC Rel. No. 402, 2010 WL 3500928, at *44 (ALJ Sept. 8, 2010).
76. Suzanne Barlyn, SEC drops “supervisor” case against ex-general counsel,
REUTERS (Jan. 27, 2012), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-sec-urban-idUSTRE80
Q16N20120127 (explaining the industry in this broad view of “supervisor” makes
compliance officers easy targets for the SEC).
77. See generally 18 U.S.C. (2012).
78. Id. § 2.
79. Nye & Nissen v. United States, 336 U.S. 613, 618 (1949).
80. 18 U.S.C. § 3.
81. Id. § 551.
82. Id. § 657.
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fraud, including knowingly making false material statements, may be held
criminally liable by the DOJ. 83 CCOs who knowingly engage in money
laundering may also be liable for fines up to $500,000 or twice the value of
the laundered property (whichever is greater), and/or up to twenty years
imprisonment. 84
III. COMPLIANCE REGULATIONS
A. Banks and Banking
Banking compliance regulations are issued by the OCC, the FDIC, the
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve, the Treasury Department, and
the CFPB, under Title 12 of the Code of Federal Regulations. 85 The OCC
requires CCOs to establish a compliance program with a system of internal
controls, provide for independent compliance testing, and designate and
train individuals responsible for day–to–day compliance. 86 The OCC may
bring civil monetary penalties for failure to comply with these consumer
protection provisions against a CCO, up to $7,500 for each day the
violations continue. 87
The FDIC may bring civil penalties, for violations of the Change in Bank
Control Act in three tiers. 88 Strict liability will be imposed for any
violators up to $5,000 per day; persons who recklessly violate the
regulations face fines up to $47,340 per day; and persons who knowingly
violate the regulation face fines up to $1,000,000 per day. 89 A CCO may
also incur civil penalties from the FDIC for false or misleading statements
during an investigation. 90
Financial institutions are also regulated under Title 31 of the United
States Code of Federal Regulations by the DOJ and FinCEN. 91 CCOs must
take reasonable steps to ensure that their institutions have adequate
procedures governing Federal tax matters, and may be liable if he or she
willfully, recklessly, or through gross incompetence, fail to do so, or do not
take reasonable steps to ensure the procedures are properly followed. 92
Additional liability may be imposed on a CCO if he knows, or should
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.

Id. §§ 1349, 1623.
Id. § 1956(a)(1)(ii).
See generally 12 C.F.R. (2016).
Id. § 21.21(c)–(d).
Id. § 30.6(b).
Id. §§ 308.116, 308.502.
Id. § 308.116.
Id. § 308.502(a)(i)–(iii).
See generally 31 C.F.R. (2016).
Id. § 10.36(a).
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know, that an employee is not complying, and the CCO willfully,
recklessly, or through gross incompetence, fails to correct the
noncompliance. 93
CCOs who willfully violate the prohibition on structuring transactions to
avoid currency reporting requirements are subject to FinCEN civil penalties
up to the amount involved in the transaction. 94 A compliance officer who
willfully participates in the violation of any reporting requirements for
foreign accounts or transactions may be assessed a civil penalty larger than
$25,000 or the amount involved in the transaction up to $100,000. 95
The SEC may bring its own charges against a swap dealer CCO for
failure to complete the duties of a CCO or failure to implement and monitor
CCOs who voluntarily submit correct
a compliance program. 96
information to the SEC regarding misconduct may be shielded from
liability. 97 However, if a CCO knowingly or willingly makes false or
fraudulent statements to the SEC, he could be liable for both criminal and
civil penalties. 98
IV. CONCLUSION
While the modern compliance environment is complex to navigate,
businesses can look to their CCOs to ensure that their compliance programs
align with current legal and regulatory requirements. Although the
regulations and laws vary depending on the industry, CCOs should
familiarize themselves with these rules to minimize their personal
company’s liability and the risk to their employers (and its reputation).
Positions in compliance are demanding and require a company’s top talent
to be carried out effectively. However, as analyzed above, the current state
of regulatory oversight is ever changing and the potential for significant
personal liability upon compliance officers is high. Care must be taken by
both industry and regulators to ensure that qualified personnel remain
willing to accept the important responsibilities taken on by CCOs.
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